Center For Strategic & International Studies
Commentary by Jane Nakano
Published September 3, 2025
The momentum for nuclear energy has reached a new height in the United States, following the White House’s issuance of four nuclear energy-related executive orders in late May. In particular, the U.S. administration is amplifying the prospective role of advanced reactors in meeting energy requirements associated with AI use, as well as ensuring the reliable operation of defense installations. As they aim to supercharge the domestic buildout and export, the executive orders have laid out some concrete goals.
On the domestic front, the Trump administration aims to quadruple the country’s installed domestic capacity by 2050, while building 10 new large-scale reactors by 2030. Specifically, quadrupling domestic capacity would mean adding 12 gigawatts—roughly equivalent to 12 large reactor units, 100 units of 120-megawatt (MW) capacity small, modularized reactors (SMR), or some combination of the two—annually between now and 2050. Internationally, the administration aims to “pursue” 20 new nuclear cooperation agreements by January 2029. While highly aspirational from a technical and logistical perspective, these goals provide clear directional guidance to a range of stakeholders, including U.S. reactor vendors, utilities, industrial off-takers, and investors. What is under-articulated, however, is how the United States should overcome some of its domestic supply chain shortfalls. One apparent solution is to partner with close U.S. allies with complementary expertise.
The first area meriting close international partnership is in the manufacturing of specialized reactor components. Large reactors, such as those comprising the nation’s commercial nuclear fleet, generally range from 800 to 1,200 MW in electricity-generation capacity. They utilize large components, including reactor pressure vessels, which require very large forging and fabrication facilities. Since the May executive order, Westinghouse Corp. has announced its plan to start construction of 10 new AP1000 (1,000 MW electrical pressurized water reactor) by 2030. A week earlier, Texas-based Fermi America filed the first round of regulatory documents with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build four units of AP1000 reactor, the first unit coming into commercial service by 2032.
While a large forging capacity may not be required for a future fleet of SMRs, it is essential for building new large-scale reactors, as well as replacing large components like steam generators and pressurizers, to maintain the existing reactors. The bad news may be that such facilities no longer exist in the United States, but the good news is that they mainly exist in South Korea and Japan, two of the U.S. treaty allies and close economic partners. Such complementarity is already evident from nuclear projects overseas that involve U.S. technologies. For example, the Westinghouse AP1000 projects in China, which were undertaken a few decades ago, had their reactor vessels supplied by Doosan of South Korea.
Such international partnerships, in the form of engaging foreign suppliers for key components, can support the U.S. nuclear industry that faces an urgent task of realizing robust domestic buildouts. Notably, the aforementioned Texas project by Fermi has attracted the interest of Doosan, resulting in a memorandum of understanding to cooperate, including supplying reactor units, during South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s late August visit to Washington. This formula seems ready for robust replication at home.
Second, one of the most important elements in realizing the advanced reactor industry is secure and reliable access to fuels. Almost all small, modularized advanced reactors under development in the United States require High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuels (i.e., uranium enriched to greater than 5 percent and less than 20 percent of the U-235 isotope). Currently, Russia and China are the only countries with the infrastructure to produce HALEU at scale. Mitigating the reliance on these geopolitical competitors for materials that would fuel the future fleet of clean electricity sources is a key task deserving of U.S. leadership and its strong partnerships with close allies. Additionally, the United States is already highly import-reliant for low-enriched uranium fuel to power its current fleet of large, light-water reactors. Today, the domestic capacity only satisfies one-third of fuel needs, and about 20 percent of the U.S. fuel needs is met from the Russian supply.
The U.S. government has begun providing a combination of direct funding and contract awards to expedite the establishment of domestic enrichment capacity. Most recently, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announced a federal land lease with General Matter, Inc., a California-based company that was one of the four companies DOE selected last fall, to provide domestic HALEU production as part of the DOE effort to help speed up private-sector enrichment services. Investment from allied nations could bolster the financial foundation for these U.S. companies seeking to establish a domestic HALEU supply chain. Some of the close allied nations planning to deploy advanced reactors, such as Japan and South Korea, share the United States’ concern over supply-chain risks that could arise from geopolitical confrontations with Russia and China. The by Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. to “explore potential investment to support expansion of Centrus’ uranium enrichment plant in Piketon, Ohio,” during the aforementioned presidential visit in August signals how strategic investment from trusted allies could further the U.S. endeavor.
Whether discussing hardware (such as reactor vessels) or fuels, investments from allied nations could indeed be an important solution by complementing the U.S. supply-chain shortfalls. And, thanks to the bipartisan passage of the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 (the ADVANCE Act), the United States is open for more substantial investment opportunities from allied nations that could augment the commerciality of emerging U.S. projects. Essentially removing a blanket foreign-ownership prohibition under the Atomic Energy Act, the ADVANCE Act clarified that foreign ownership, control and domination is allowed for an entity that is from a member country of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or India so long as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determines that issuing the license is not inimical to the U.S. national security as well as the public health and safety.
While much of the current administration’s focus is on domestic capacity, the time is also ripe for the United States to advance its long-standing effort to rectify the level playing field that is currently missing in global nuclear commerce. Countries like Russia and China often engage in dumping practices by offering sub-commercial terms in their marketing of nuclear power projects. In contrast, OECD member countries that export nuclear power projects are bound by a host of rules and conditions set by the OECD under the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, last updated in September 2024. The arrangement stipulates what is acceptable for repayment terms, repayment frequencies, and rates as related to export credits for nuclear power plants. Additionally, the arrangement prohibits the provision of free nuclear fuel or services, as well as “aid support,” in conjunction with the export credit.
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are becoming increasingly open to supporting nuclear projects. Following the June announcement by the World Bank to begin supporting nuclear projects, other MDBs like the Asia Development Bank are also considering whether or not to follow suit. One of the major issues these MDBs must navigate is that Russia and China, which are not OECD members and thus are not bound by its international rules and standards on export credit provisions, are also their donor nations. Now is the time for greater U.S. partnerships with like-minded OECD governments—most of whom are also MDB donors—to share their experiences and expertise in support of MDB efforts to formulate effective and viable roles in enabling nuclear energy as an option for energy security and economic development in the Global South.
Concurrently, the United States needs to put its house in order in terms of effectuating strategic use of its key financial institutions, such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corp. (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM). DFC, whose seven-year statute is shortly coming to an end and must be reauthorized by early October for continued operation, is empowered to provide direct equity capability, debt financing, insurance, and technical assistance. Although DFC lifted its ban on financing nuclear projects in 2020, its support has been limited to issuing Letters of Intent to participate in prospective U.S. nuclear projects abroad. Smooth reauthorization would be a good first step, followed by its capacity expansion in areas such as the contingent liability cap, where the current $60 billion level is deemed too low to enable effective support for large nuclear projects. Furthermore, reauthorization in 2026 presents EXIM with an opportunity to augment its support for nuclear projects, for example, by including nuclear in the list of key technology sectors eligible for greater support under EXIM’s China and Transformational Exports Program. Sharpening the strategic effectiveness of these tools will put the United States in a better position to pursue 20 new nuclear cooperation agreements, as envisioned by the administration.
Industrial partnerships with allies are not about ceding some of the job opportunities or other economic gains to foreign businesses and workers. Countries with shared geopolitical concerns and complementary industrial expertise are a key missing piece in nuclear supply chains upon which the United States seeks to rebuild its vibrant domestic fleet while also propelling exports. The above areas should provide a clear blueprint for international partnerships that can bring the U.S. leadership vision to reality.
Jane Nakano is a senior fellow in the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
